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Internal mechanisms that uphold the reliability of published scientific results have failed 
across many sciences, including some that are major sources of science news. Traditional 
methods for reporting science in the mass media do not effectively compensate for this 
unreliability. I argue for a new conceptual framework in which science journalists and sci-
entists form a complex knowledge community, with science news as the interdisciplinary 
product. This approach motivates forms of collaboration and training that can improve 
the epistemic reliability of science news.
Keywords: replication crisis, science journalism, reporting uncertainty, mass media ethics, interdisciplinary 
collaboration, collaborative knowledge, science communication
In a panel discussion of the problem of communicating uncertain scientific results to the public, 
former New York Times science reporter and editor Phillip Boffey remarks:
One of the problems in journalism is to try to find what is really going on, what is accurate 
and which sources to trust. What makes it slightly easier in the science arena than in others 
is the mechanisms that are designed to both produce consensus and reduce uncertainty 
in science. A peer-reviewed journal gives reporters more confidence than an unreviewed 
source because at least someone who knew something about the subject looked at the 
paper. (Friedman et al., 1999)
Boffey adds that uncertainty is a smaller problem for science reporters than for reporters covering 
other types of news “because of the scientific tradition of replicating or refuting studies and 
findings. It is a professional obligation for researchers to discuss the uncertainty of their findings.”
Boffey’s remarks reveal a traditional science journalist’s trust that the mechanisms of scientific 
research are generally reliable—that, within allowable limits for error, research is being properly 
conducted, peer-reviewed journals reliably publish only papers that have met high epistemic stand-
ards, and consensus opinion is a reliable indicator of which hypotheses are most highly confirmed 
by the evidence. Unfortunately, this trust is no longer clearly justified in many fields of scientific 
research. It is estimated that as many as half the articles in peer-reviewed journals across a wide 
variety of fields, from biomedical research to social psychology, report results that are probably 
false (Ioannidis, 2005; Simmons et al., 2011; Ioannidis et al., 2014). If so, then journalists possess 
good reasons to believe that scientists in affected fields have not conducted the inquiry necessary 
to have evidence for the reported result (Hardwig, 1985). In terms of the ethics of inquiry—the 
epistemic norms governing when belief is warranted—it may be epistemically unvirtuous for a 
journalist to believe published results in these fields, and in consequence to report them—at least 
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not without a disclaimer to the effect that the entire field is 
epistemically unreliable.1
This raises a critical issue: when a science journalist cannot 
take the proper conduct of a science for granted, what does 
this imply for the epistemically responsible conduct of her job? 
Epistemic responsibility is already a formal norm of the profes-
sion: for example, the U.S. Society for Professional Journalists’ 
Code of Ethics (Society for Professional Journalists, 2014) states 
that journalists should “take responsibility for the accuracy of 
their work” and “verify information before releasing it.” The 
question is how science journalists can satisfy these epistemic 
norms when belief that scientists are following their own ethics of 
inquiry is unwarranted. The issue generalizes to any news based 
on raw or analyzed data produced by third parties—an increas-
ingly important sector of journalism, and arguably the future of 
the profession (Nguyen and Lugo-Ocando, 2016).2 Even more 
generally: what should non-experts do when trust in the experts 
is known to be misplaced yet continued epistemic dependence on 
them is unavoidable?
In what follows, a science journalist is anyone who reports reg-
ularly on science stories, although my main concern is with those 
writing about research for mass media—i.e., “big-Journalism” 
(Borenstein, cited in Brainard, 2009).3 Although a few relevant 
national differences (noted below) arise, the epistemic concerns 
raised here are general, and science journalists, like scientists, 
are increasingly internationally networked (Russell, 2009). The 
category includes full-time science journalists (including dedi-
cated freelancers), reporters who are assigned (or take freelance 
assignments) on regular occasions to report on science, and some 
citizen journalists (including scientists presenting their or others’ 
research results for big-Journalism outlets—e.g., Iacoboni et al., 
2007). Science journalism is understood narrowly as including 
stories about research, in contrast to a broad sense in which 
science is linked to non-science stories by way of explaining 
an aspect of that event, such as a natural disaster (Summ and 
Volpers, 2015).
ePisteMic FAiLUres iN scieNce
The Big Three types of research misconduct—fabrication, 
falsification, and plagiarism—are clear failures to meet science’s 
epistemic responsibility for results published in peer-reviewed 
journals. They are condemned by virtually all national policies 
1 The ethics of belief concerns the conditions under which we should believe some-
thing—for example, only when we have sufficient evidence, or else when evidence 
is not sufficient but it is prudential to believe (Chignell, 2016 provides an overview).
2 While I focus on numerically based research, the problem generalizes to subdis-
ciplines that focus on sociocultural concerns and contexts, insofar as this research 
too can be done questionably but without clearly violating established standards 
of research misconduct (discussed below). See Bender et al. (2010) and Rose and 
Abi-Rached (2013) for recent attempts to encourage collaboration between differ-
ent research traditions (in anthropology and in the mind sciences, respectively).
3 Most Americans get science news from mainstream print and broadcast media 
(Dunwoody, 2008/2014; American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
2015). Many science journalists in other countries also work for mass media outlets 
(Russell, 2009), and it is likely their audiences mainly get their science news from 
these outlets too.
on research misconduct (Altman, 2006; Resnik et al., 2015; U.S. 
Federal Policy on Research Misconduct) and are easy to compre-
hend, criticize, and convey to the lay public. However, they are 
peripheral to the current epistemic problem.
The sources of current failures are subtle, hard for non-
scientists to grasp, and morally ambiguous—hence the general 
label “questionable research practices,” or QRPs (Gardner et al., 
2005; Martinson et al., 2005; John et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2012; 
Ioannidis et al., 2014).4 Although the “replication crisis” in psy-
chology may be most widely known, it is a tip of the QRP iceberg.5 
In some cases, non-replicability (or non-reproducibility) can be 
traced to QRPs (Begley, 2013). But results that are not replicable 
may not have involved QRPs; there may be no attempted replica-
tions of results in which QRPs may or may not have occurred; and 
studies that are QRP-free may not be submitted for publication at 
all if the results are negative or mixed.
The general context is one of the failures in mechanisms for 
producing and publishing research results in a reliable way. 
Failures in research include various ways of nudging results of a 
study in a desired direction. Failures in publication include prac-
tices that result in epistemically damaging distortions in a field’s 
publication record. Some QRPs are common enough to have 
labels. “p-value fishing” or “p-value hacking” includes analyzing 
data in various ways in order to obtain a result that falls within 
the p ≤ 0.05 threshold for statistical significance, the conventional 
level at which one can reject the null hypothesis. “Adaptive 
sampling” involves stopping data collection prematurely once a 
wanted result is obtained, or continuing to collect data if results 
are nearly, but not quite, statistically significant; sometimes data 
are excluded after looking at its impact on statistical significance. 
Sometimes dependent measures that do not reach statistical 
significance are not reported in order to eliminate “imperfect” 
results, which are difficult to publish. The “file drawer effect” is 
when studies that have negative or non-confirmatory results are 
not submitted for review, given that peer-review journals prefer 
high-impact results as well as new studies (non-replications). 
This yields systematic bias in the pool of papers submitted for 
review and in the publication record (Easterbrook et al., 1991). 
There is also lack of thorough peer review of submissions (Begley, 
2013; Alberts et al., 2014).
These and other technical—to outsiders, mysterious— 
misbehaviors “present greater threats to the scientific enterprise 
than those caused by high-profile misconduct cases such 
as fraud” (Martinson et  al., 2005). QRPs may or may not be a 
slippery slope to fraud in individual cases (Crocker, 2011), but 
4 Neuroskeptic (2010) put falsification in the ninth circle of “scientific hell”; the 
other eight circles included mainly QRPs. One commenter responded: “I miss a 
circle for shoddy/sensationalist science journalism. Or do they get a hell all for 
themselves?”
5 Online discussion includes PsychFileDrawer (Available at: http://www.psych-
filedrawer.org/TheFiledrawerProblem.php); PubPeer.com; Retractionwatch.com; 
Open Science Collaboration (2015); F1000Research.com; Cortex Registered 
Report; Many Labs Replication Project and Reproducibility Project of the Center 
for Open Science; FlexibleMeasures.com; Badscience.net. Other discussion in print 
include Fanelli (2010); Lehrer (2010); Schooler (2011, 2014); Nosek et al. (2012); 
Flier (2016); Bohannon (2015); Etz and Vanderkerckhove (2016). See Cumming 
(2012, 2015) on reforming statistical practices.
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they can make a field’s entire publication record unreliable. 
John et al. (2011) estimated that in psychology the actual preva-
lence of various adaptive sampling techniques was 100% based 
on high rates (62–72%) of self-admitted cases. Kühlberger et al. 
(2014) found evidence of a cumulative effect of QRPs: in their 
sample of 1,000 published papers across psychology, about three 
times as many studies just reached the p ≤ 0.05 threshold than 
just failed to reach it.
Despite the widespread epistemic damage they can cause, 
QRPs are much harder to eliminate than the Big Three. A field’s 
publication record cannot be quarantined via retraction the way 
selective publications by a single researcher can be. QRPs are also 
morally, legally, and professionally ambiguous. The Committee on 
Publication Ethics Code of Conduct (Committee on Publication 
Ethics, 2011) for best peer-reviewed journal editor practices lists 
“ensuring the integrity of the academic record” in its formal code; 
the associated recommendation states that “errors, inaccurate or 
misleading statements must be corrected promptly and with due 
prominence.” QRPs are not clear cases of any of these. At best, 
they “lie somewhere on a continuum between scientific fraud, 
bias, and simple carelessness,” and while many scientists admit to 
“alteration” or “modification” of data, they also do not think this 
amounts to falsification (Fanelli, 2009). To date, QRPs are treated 
as “inconsequential” rather than “career-ending” sins (Simmons 
et  al., 2011); “there is no real consequence for investigators or 
journals” for engaging in them (Begley, 2013).
Note that QRPs are not limited to psychology. Martinson 
et al.’s (Martinson et al., 2005) misconduct survey was of research-
ers who had received funding from the U.S. National Institutes 
of Health; Ioannidis et  al. (2014) report evidence of QRPs in 
neuroimaging and preclinical studies, including animal studies; 
and Fanelli (2009) report that misconduct was more frequently 
reported in their survey by medical/pharmacological researchers 
than others. However, even if the current crisis were limited to 
medical research and psychology, these areas are major sources 
of science news.
The concept of a conflict of interest, in both research and 
media ethics, is usually narrowly defined in terms of possible 
personal gain or loss avoidance. In today’s scientific climate, the 
primary conflict of interest is between the pursuit of publish-
ability and the pursuit of truth (Nosek et al., 2012). There is an 
analogous conflict of interest in journalism whenever the ethics 
of inquiry take a back seat to the imperative of public appeal. 
This conflict is exacerbated when journalists are unable to satisfy 
the epistemic norms of their profession, as discussed in the next 
section.
ePisteMic vULNerABiLitY iN 
JOUrNALisM
Many journalists take, or frequently have no choice but to take, 
a stance toward science characteristic of a member of a lay 
community, which lacks the expertise to assess results and is 
not involved in the research yielding those results (Grasswick, 
2010). Laypersons judge what to believe by judging whom to 
believe (Anderson, 2011:145). In this case, scientists have 
specialized knowledge, and the lay stance in science journalism 
is a response to this knowledge deficit. It is a perspective from 
which science happens in a separate box (Lief, 2015). It induces a 
sharp asymmetry in perceived epistemic responsibility between 
scientists and journalists regarding the production of reliable 
science news.
The lay stance is institutionalized and reinforced by the 
practices of assigning reporters without scientific knowledge 
to science stories or assigning those with background in one 
science to report on another. In the U.S., if not in all countries, 
budget and staff cuts in mass media (Brainard, 2009; Murcott, 
2009; Nature, 2009; Russell, 2009) entail that big-Journalism 
science reporting from the lay stance is the rule, not the excep-
tion. Institutions that do not have the public interest at heart can 
step into the breach (e.g., Göpfort, 2007, in Germany). Although 
general reporting experience is more highly correlated with reli-
able science stories than training in a science (Wilson, 2000), it 
is unlikely that only experienced reporters are being assigned 
science stories.
There is ample pragmatic justification for these assignment 
practices. As one British science news editor put it:
If a guy’s got a paper in Nature that’s been subject to 
peer review I have absolutely no qualms about quoting 
everything he says in full and being unquestioning. That 
sounds awful in a way but we’re a high speed operation, 
you know. (Hansen, 1994)
But the lay stance is not essentially a pragmatic response 
to time pressure. It is rooted in the historical fact that science 
reporting initiated (in the U.S.) as a cheerleading enterprise that 
involved translating science for lay audiences in order to win 
public appreciation for the benefits science provides to society 
(Lewenstein, 1992; Brainard, 2008; Rensberger, 2009). However, 
while science’s high socioepistemic status has been tarnished by 
greater recognition and reporting of the bad consequences of 
science, there has been little change in journalists’ inability to 
recognize bad science. While science has become more quan-
titative—adding mathematical and computational modeling to 
statistics and other traditional mathematical tools and reasoning 
methods (e.g., Castellano et al., 2009; Baronchelli et al., 2013)—
many journalists still cannot do the math (see below). As long 
as the lay stance persists, it is misleading to characterize this 
journalistic shift as one from “science lapdog to public watchdog” 
(Rensberger, quoted in Brainard, 2008).
The epistemic helplessness of the lay stance becomes obviously 
problematic when we have good reason to be skeptical about 
general research and publication practices in a field. Engber 
(2016) notes “We’d like to think that a published study has more 
than even odds of being true.” From the lay stance, the reporter 
is unable to improve upon these odds. The actual reliability of a 
particular result is not affected by quoting other scientists. The 
public still may as well toss a coin to determine its credibility. 
Compounding this with the journalistic bias for novelty, it is 
more likely than ever that the public will be exposed to unreliable 
science news (Dunwoody, 2008/2014; American Association for 
the Advancement of Science and Center for Public Engagement 
with Science and Technology, 2015). Even in a field with a reliable 
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publication record, an individual study flawed by QRPs is a prob-
lem for science news.
The obvious response is that since the scientists possess the 
knowledge, they are responsible for the epistemic integrity of 
science news. This position is unjustified. Suppose the science 
journalist sees her epistemic responsibility as limited to not 
inserting noise into the communication channel between scien-
tists and the public. Without someone to do epistemic triage in an 
affected field—a function that properly conducted science makes 
moot—even a noiseless transmission channel will spew reliable 
and unreliable research alike into the public sphere. Epistemic 
norms would counsel not covering the affected fields until 
researchers get their act together. Suppose the journalist sees her 
professional role as more than being a pipeline between scientists 
and the public. She must still avoid epistemically misleading 
framing choices and other mediations. The lay stance makes it a 
matter of luck or intuition whether her choices are epistemically 
virtuous ones.
Current norms of objective journalism or the “journalism of 
verification” (Kovach and Rosensteil, 2001) sidestep journalistic 
epistemic responsibility. The objective journalist strives for 
verifiable facts, accurate reporting of events, impartial reporting 
and writing, and a detached, impersonal point of view. Practices 
associated with this norm—modeled on the scientific method 
(Nelkin, 1987; Schudson, 2001)—include using neutral language 
(detachment), fairly representing positions and actors (impar-
tiality), and getting both sides of the story (balance) (Schudson, 
1978, 2001; Mindich, 1998; Schudson and Anderson, 2009; Vos, 
2011). But these practices guide descriptions of people and their 
words and actions. They presuppose the ability to verify facts and 
ensure accuracy, which the science journalist reporting from the 
lay stance does not have. Trust is essential to journalism, but not 
blind trust. In this case, “trust but verify” becomes “trust, and 
trust some more.”
When divorced from the ability to verify, these practices can 
wreak havoc on the epistemic status of science news. When 
reporters cannot ascertain the actual level of credibility of 
research, they may be more inclined to frame a science story 
in ways that raise or lower its appearance of credibility instead 
(Dixon and Clarke, 2013). They may be more likely to use epis-
temically damaging metaphors, such as by drawing unjustified 
analogies to human stereotypes (e.g., Hoffman, 2016). They may 
use balance (or competing voices) without considering that this 
practice transforms any degree of uncertainty about the facts 
into a difference of opinion about the facts. This is epistemically 
catastrophic on the science beat. We expect scientific opinions to 
be based on the best available evidence, but uncertainty framed 
in terms of differences of opinion suggests all scientific opinions 
are equally valid and evidence is secondary or irrelevant. The 
practice also lowers the credibility of science journalists (Jensen, 
2008 for cancer news) and empowers industry to manipulate 
public opinion and sow doubt (Antilla, 2005 and Wilson, 2000 
for climate science).
Problems in climate science communication illustrate how 
standard journalistic practices can transform reliable science into 
unreliable science news. Nearly unanimous scientific consensus 
on anthropogenic causes of climate change (if not on specific 
consequences) enabled environmental reporters to do their jobs 
much as Boffey did decades ago. But journalistic norms of balance 
have contributed to public confusion (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; 
Antilla, 2005), while social psychological research has shown the 
inadequacy of the “deficit model” of science communication, 
according to which science illiteracy is the reason behind public 
opposition to scientific findings, new technology, and environ-
mental action (Kahan et al., 2011 in the U.S., Besley and Nisbet, 
2011 for a more general view in the U.S. and U.K.). If climate 
science turned out to be riddled with QRPs, we would be back to 
the start of this paper.
As with QRPs in science, these practices also have pragmatic 
justifications. Usual pressures of time and audience appeal have 
been ramped up into a hypercompetitive reporting atmosphere 
that incentivizes science “infotainment” (Rehmann, 2013). The 
quantity of science available on the Internet promotes reliance 
on press releases from science journals or research institutions 
and homogeneity in coverage [a loss of “infodiversity” (Granado, 
2011: 810)]. Nevertheless, as Nature editors (Nature, 2009) remark, 
“society needs to see science scrutinized as well as regurgitated if 
it is to give science its trust, and journalists are an important part 
of that process.” Scientists are asking for effective watchdogs. But 
short of becoming scientists, how can journalists shoulder their 
epistemic responsibility?
WHAt is tO Be DONe?
In complex epistemic communities, no one individual has the 
expertise to verify a result and epistemic virtue depends on the 
efforts of the group. Interdisciplinary scientific collaborations are 
a primary example of such communities. Science journalists and 
scientists are another, with science news the interdisciplinary 
product. Each group is highly motivated by practical pressures: 
the scientific equivalent of “What does this mean for the every-
day person?” is “What does this mean for a follow-up study and 
another grant?” Each group individually can undermine the reli-
ability of science news by engaging in profession-specific QRPs. 
They need to work together to ensure an epistemically virtuous 
product. Specific steps might include the following.
“consensus conferences” for Guiding 
science News
In consensus conferences in biomedical research, stakehold-
ers—including experts and members of the public—meet over 
several days in a structured setting to review available evidence, 
identify research gaps, and help guide public policy on specific 
health problems.6 Consumers of big-Journalism science news 
deserve the same care, also regarding specific topics (e.g., climate 
science, vaccines, etc.). Scientist and journalist professional eth-
ics organizations (e.g., Committee on Publication Ethics, Society 
of Professional Journalists), representatives of niche and mass 
6 Consensus conferences are just one of the various integration methods (McDonald 
et  al., 2009). They were initiated in Denmark and adopted by various groups 
internationally (e.g., U.S. National Institutes for Health, https://consensus.nih.gov, 
Americas Health Foundation, http://www.the-ahf.org/consensus-conferences).
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media (and in the U.S., across the political spectrum), and sci-
ence communication professionals (e.g., J-School Faculty, Society 
of Environmental Journalists, National Association of Science 
Writers), and other stakeholders can similarly develop reviews 
of research and media coverage to guide reliable science news. 
They can also create best practice guidelines regarding general 
issues such as control of narrative structure, advisability of pre-
publication story review, responsible use of metaphor, framing, 
headlines, and other rhetorical features, and ways to deal with 
distinct sources of uncertainty (e.g., lack of clear consensus, a 
biased publication record in a field, prevalence of QRPs in a field, 
suspected QRPs in a study).
In this context, scientists and journalists are both experts 
and must integrate their expertise for better public outcomes. 
Scientists are open to such collaborative efforts (Illes et al., 2010; 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and Center 
for Public Engagement with Science and Technology, 2015; Irion, 
2015). One model of this sort of interdisciplinary collaboration 
might be “negotiation among experts” (Rossini and Porter, 
1979; Andersen and Wagenknecht, 2013) or Thagard’s (1997, 
2006) “peer-different” collaborations. In these models, expertise 
remains divided among group members and the results of sub-
tasks are integrated across boundaries by negotiation. Notably, 
this process requires “interactional expertise”: enough expertise 
regarding basic categories and concepts to communicate across 
disciplines, but not the “contributory expertise” that requires 
the knowledge and skills to perform experiments or develop 
theory (Petrie, 1976; Collins, 2007; Ribeiro, 2007; Andersen and 
Wagenknecht, 2013; Collins and Evans, 2015).
It would also mean professional cultural shifts (Reed, 2001). 
For scientists, this would mean shifting from distrust of jour-
nalists and ignorance of what journalists do to an appreciation 
of journalistic expertise (Utts, 2010; Besley and Nisbet, 2011; 
McConway, 2016). For journalists, this would mean overcom-
ing fears that collaboration with sources entails a loss of control 
and power over the news (Davis, 2009) and that understanding 
science makes a reporter less capable of reporting it (Nelkin, 
1987; Dunwoody, 2008/2014; Wilson, 2000; Nguyen and Lugo-
Ocando, 2016).
Putting the “translation” into 
“translational implications”
In the U.S., public science funding agencies often require appli-
cants to explain the public impact of the proposed research, 
but they do not require collaboration with professional science 
journalists to communicate these implications to the public. This 
requirement can become an effective tool for improved science 
news if publically funded grants must include a component 
whereby independent professional journalists are included in 
teams that turn research results into science news. This would 
be interdisciplinary interaction at a team rather than profession 
level.
innumeracy should Be the New illiteracy
Effective collaboration at the profession and team levels requires 
journalists to be functionally bilingual between “Sciencese” 
and “Publicese,” that portion of a natural language in which 
such terms as “ice floe” and “symmetry” are too technical to be 
included (Schneider, 2008). In Schneider’s (Schneider, 2008) 
illuminating ethnographic study of a Society of Environmental 
Journalists’ “science immersion” workshop in climate science, 
the most highly praised exercise involved reading peer-reviewed 
science papers together. But the groups read the introduction 
and discussion sections. In practice, scientists often just read the 
methods and result sections, because that’s where the data are.
Calls for greater numeracy are not new (e.g., Curtin and Maier, 
2001), but they have not been widely implemented in education 
or treated consistently or urgently (Wilson, 2000; Berret and 
Phillips, 2016; Griffin and Dunwoody, 2016; Nguyen and Lugo-
Ocando, 2016; for basic coding, see Doherty, 2012). There are 
multiple reasons for slow change. For example, if humanities 
pipelines into journalism majors and J-schools are filled with 
math averse students, leading to fears of low enrollments (Hewett, 
2016), the solution may be recruiting students from science, tech-
nology, engineering, and mathematics fields as double majors or 
graduate students.
Perhaps the epistemic vulnerability revealed by the problems 
in science will be the tipping point for greater numeracy. 
Prior motivations include avoiding manipulation by interest 
groups, promoting journalistic autonomy, giving professionals 
an edge over citizen journalists, and empowering them to think 
more creatively about science news. Numeracy would enable 
journalists to shift from the blind trust characteristic of the 
lay stance to a position of justified credence (Hardwig, 1991; 
Goldman, 2001).
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